Maritime Security

European Parliament



Protecting EU's Maritime Environment: Towards a European Maritime Security Strategy?

ESRT

P2C

DCNS

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POSTER: Round Table, 18 September 2013

A future Maritime Security Strategy for the EU
and the protection of European Sea Borders





hosted by MEP Georgios Koumoutsakos

Speakers:



Georgios Koumoutsakos, MEP
Rapporteur on the Integrated Maritime Policy financial regulation



Vice Admiral Patrick Hebrard
Wise Pens International



Beate Gminder
Head of Unit Maritime Policy,
DG Mare, European Commission



A Maritime Surveillance demonstration - based on the FP7 I2C project :



Michel Morel
I2C Project Coordinator



Why this Booklet?

Giorgios Koumoutsakos *is a Member of the European Parliament. He was rapporteur on the Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP) Financial Regulation and the initiator of the European Parliament's Resolution on Maritime Piracy.*

On September 18, 2013, together with the European Security Roundtable (ESRT) we co-hosted at the European Parliament a roundtable discussion on "A future Maritime Security Strategy for the EU and the protection of European Sea Borders." Maritime security is steadily moving up on the European Union's agenda. The event provided an opportunity for a timely discussion on the need for formulating a Maritime Security Strategy for the EU at a time when EU's maritime interests are growing and the EU is making an important step forward through the European Maritime Security Strategy (EMSS) which is scheduled to be adopted by the Council in 2014.

One of the key points that emerged during the discussion is that the formulation of a comprehensive concept of a European Maritime Security Strategy is necessary as the EU is a global maritime player and it needs to promote and safeguard its interests in the maritime commons. Such a concept should clearly identify the maritime threats and challenges currently facing the EU; will determine the maritime strategic priorities and objectives, (political, economic, energy, environmental and military) as well as EU's level of ambition; and finally, it should serve as a roadmap regarding the tools and means the EU should use to counter these threats, protect its citizens and further its interests in the maritime domain.

Additionally, participants agreed that if the EU is to successfully tackle the 21st century maritime challenges, closer cooperation between the EU and partner countries as well as with relevant international organizations is much needed. Interagency cooperation between European institutions and agencies involved in maritime affairs, and cooperation between the military and civilian authorities is also required. During the event, participants had the opportunity to listen to very interesting policy and operational speeches. This booklet contains both the speeches delivered at the roundtable seminar as well as opinion pieces written by senior policymakers in the field of maritime security.

Georgios Koumoutsakos
Member of the European Parliament

Recommendations

- Tackling sea-related challenges and threats requires a response that **combines military and civilian tools efficiently**.
- Besides military force, **other methods must be coordinated** with the measured application of force such as diplomacy, economics, strategic communication.
- The **United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)** shall provide the legal framework for all types of activities carried out in the seas and oceans.
- **Additional civilian capabilities** such as the scientific ones that are better able to comprehend the status and evolution of the maritime environment need to be integrated at the operational level.
- **Protecting the environment** needs to be added to the ESS strategic objectives list.
- **European research and innovation** shall be strong enough to feed Maritime Security matters.
- In order to be able to address a common response to challenges at sea, the EU needs to develop a global European maritime surveillance system. The **I2C prototype could be the basis of such a future system.**
- The validation process of **I2C should be further supported by exercises in real conditions** conducted by end users, in order to get operational feedbacks and to demonstrate the added value of the prototype in performing early detection /identification of illegal and criminal activities at sea.

Speakers

"The current maritime security environment presents an increasingly complex set of challenges, risks, and threats for the European Union".



The Challenge

Background

Routes of transportation

EU's coastline
Over **90.000 km** crossing two oceans and four seas

Maritime flows
90% of EU's external trade

Marine & maritime sector
5.4 million Europeans employed & **88 million** working in coastal regions, where over 205 million live

EU's Member States
World's biggest Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of **25 million square meters**

Internal trade
Over **40%** is sea born

Maritime commons
Source of raw resources such as energy and nutrition

Maritime Annual Gross Value Added
Approximately **495 billion €**

Europe´s welfare and security is linked to the seas. The EU has a coastline of over 90.000 km that crosses two oceans and four seas and its member states constitute the world's biggest Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of around 25 million square meters. The seas and coasts of Europe are a vital resource upon which millions of European citizens depend, both economically and for their quality and safety of life. The maritime commons are a source of raw resources, such as energy and nutrition for Europe´s population.

What is more, the marine and maritime sectors are crucial drivers for growth and jobs for the EU economy. European overseas territories, navies and shipyards remain potent symbols of and crucial conduits for European global power and influence in an ever more interconnected world. In a nutshell, Europe is bound with and dependent on the sea. As such, it cannot afford to ignore the ongoing changes to the maritime environment and its security challenges.

Indeed, the current maritime security environment presents an increasingly complex set of challenges, risks, and threats for the European Union, including:

- The intensification of global maritime flows in combination with the increasingly complex maritime system
- The increase in irregular migration by sea in combination with porous maritime borders. European member states are increasingly concerned about the growing influx of immigrants to Europe as a result of the Arab Spring and the ongoing civil war in Syria
- The political instability and geopolitical turbulence in the eastern Mediterranean, Europe´s southern flank
- The illegal movement of drugs and arms, as well as the human trafficking through the sea
- The overexploitation of resources, including the growing competition over fish stocks
- The extraction of energy and minerals offshore which is fuelling high competition between states, and finally,
- The interruption of the free flow of trade through strategic sea routes by a number of maritime non-state actors, such as pirates and terrorists.

Developing an EU strategy for ensuring the security and openness of the global maritime commons is therefore not so much a matter of choice and a signal of growing European ambitions, but a prerequisite for protecting Europe's vital Sea Lines Of Communication, safeguarding its maritime interests and ensuring Europe's own future as a global maritime actor.

For all these reasons, Europe and its member states – we, that is – do not have the luxury of not having a comprehensive, cohesive and robust Maritime Strategic Doctrine, with designated interests, priorities, risks and strategic goals, nor do we have an option when it comes to being fully aware of our potential, our means and our weaknesses, to serve such a strategy.

Operation ATALANTA - the European Union´s first ever naval operation - greatly illustrates the need for such a doctrine. In operational terms, ATALANTA makes a strong contribution to combating piracy and securing vital sea lines of communication. Simultaneously, the EU is providing humanitarian assistance and is working towards eradicating the root causes of piracy on land by contributing to the social and economic development of Somalia. ATALANTA verifies that the EU approach to security is- and should be- multidimensional.

In this regard, the need to increase civil-military cooperation should be emphasized. Definitely, strengthening cooperation between civilian and military authorities is not easy, but it is a necessity. Many of the sea-related challenges and threats described above are not exclusively of a military or a civilian nature, and thus cannot be exclusively addressed through a military or civilian response. Tackling them requires a comprehensive response, one that combines military and civilian tools. Maritime surveillance for example is a dual-use technology that can be used in both civilian and military applications.

Unfortunately, until now the steps that have been taken on the EU level to shape a maritime security strategic concept have been few, modest and fragmented. The Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP) and the European Security Strategy (ESS) despite their undeniable value cannot substitute for a comprehensive concept focused on a European Maritime Security Strategy. Yet, it seems that we are now slowly moving in the right direction. Some positive developments have been made lately both at the European Parliament and in the European Commission. Furthermore, it is expected that the upcoming Greek Presidency of the EU will put emphasis on maritime affairs. In this context, one should expect that it is high likely that the European Maritime Security Strategy (EMSS), which is expected to be launched towards the end of the year, will enhance EU´s maritime posture.

It goes without saying that the solid and uncontested basis for such a European maritime strategic doctrine is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which provides the legal framework for all types of activities carried out in the seas and oceans. It is not by chance that the European Parliament has repeatedly called on the EU and the Member-States to promote the universality of this Convention and to insist on the need for uniform and consistent implementation of its provisions.

2014 will enhance EU´s maritime posture. It goes without saying that the solid and uncontested basis for such a European maritime strategic doctrine is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which provides the legal framework for all types of activities carried out in the seas and oceans. It is not by chance that the European Parliament has repeatedly called on the EU and the Member-States to promote the universality of this Convention and to insist on the need for uniform and consistent implementation of its provisions.





"In order to provide concrete actions and results, the EU should elaborate a strategic document".



The Need For a Strategic Document

Vice Admiral Patrick Hebrard *is a member of Wise Pens International, a European consultancy specialising in maritime security policy and advice. Since 2009, they work with the EDA and produce studies on Maritime Surveillance in support of CSDP and, recently, on Naval challenges in the Arctic Region. He is also Associate Fellow of the Foundation for Strategic Research. He has written opinions and studies on maritime trade, the Indian Ocean, a comprehensive approach in operations, the Chinese navy, Wealth in the oceans.*

The EU has a true interest in securing its maritime environment to allow the freedom of the seas and a peaceful exploitation of the ocean's riches. Countering maritime terrorism and the resurgence of high profile piracy has become a priority. Technology is now enabling surveillance and monitoring of that space but effective governance depends on cooperative information sharing and coordinated enforcement by different assets and capabilities. Enabling that development requires a strategy analyzing the maritime environment, identifying the strategic objectives and how they might be achieved.

First, the EU has elaborated "A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy" (ESS), in 2003. It was re-evaluated in the Progress Report of 2008 and provided a conceptual basis for European security. Second, the "Integrated Maritime Policy" (IMP) issued in 2007 was willing to reach a more collaborative decision-making among the Members States and the administrations, and aiming to ensure ocean sustainability. It included a programme of work on several issues such as transport without barriers, strategy for maritime research, maritime surveillance network and maritime spatial planning. It underlined that security, besides constituting a government' first duty towards its citizens, also affects their economy and wellbeing. These documents must be used as a cornerstone for EU's diplomacy on maritime affairs.





European Security Strategy Objectives

Addressing the Threats

The line of defence will often be abroad. European maritime borders will sometimes be on the shores of foreign countries so the EU should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. New threats are not exclusively military. They cannot be tackled by purely military means anymore.

Achieving an International Order based on Effective Multilateralism

Collaboration with third parties in building maritime situational awareness and controlling the sea is paramount. It depends on establishing mutual trust and confidence. This applies in particular to the sea basins those parties share, where information exchange is critical for the common good.

Building Security in our Neighbourhood

It is impossible to widen the area of stability in neighbours regions only by acting on land. The Mediterranean and Black Seas must become stable environments. Any attempt to undermine legal and peaceful trade or to carry out hostile and illegal actions and over-exploitation of resources should be identified and countered promptly.

However, in order to secure its maritime environment and to provide concrete actions and results, the EU should elaborate a strategic document: a European Maritime Security Strategy (EMSS). Besides military force, other tools should be employed. Diplomacy, economics, strategic communication and many other methods must be coordinated with the measured application of force. Confrontation today more often stems from non-states who usually prefer to employ proxies or some other indirect means when challenging other states. Asymmetry and outsourcing are therefore the common characteristics of the wide variety of perils threatening EU's environment. Therefore, a conceptual approach to confrontation becomes even starker in the conflicts of the 21st century where the opposition takes a multifaceted form.

A comprehensive approach is inherent in any maritime security strategy. The maritime world is particularly vulnerable to the application of various pressures and has always been an integral part of foreign policy. Therefore, the European External Action Service (EEAS) has to be directly involved in related maritime issues. Civilian agencies must be organised and prepared to co-ordinate their efforts with those of defence for the ultimate protection of Europe's way of life and prosperity. Conversely, the defence community should also be prepared to assist civilian security agencies when the action required is properly under civilian leadership. Moreover, the protection of the maritime domain itself should be promoted. A number of initiatives has been undertaken by the EU to safeguard the maritime environment but such efforts needs a deliberate approach in order to safeguard the entire sea basins surrounding the EU. Additional civilian capabilities such as the scientific ones that are better able to comprehend the status and evolution of the maritime environment need to be integrated at the operational level. So far, they have mainly supported the EU decision-making process at the policy level. Finally, the ability to forecast and deal with natural maritime disasters, like tsunamis and typhoons must be included within the array of EU's activities in this area. Protecting the environment needs to be added to the ESS strategic objectives list.

"More cooperation is fundamental to safeguard our interests, to protect our citizens and to save and reduce budgets".



The Necessity of Political Cooperation

Beate Gminder *is Head of the Unit "Maritime Policy in the Mediterranean and Black Sea" at the European Commission, DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries. She is supervising political and technical developments of the Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE) for a better maritime surveillance including pilot projects with 14 Member States. She supports the development of a maritime strategy for the Adriatic-Ionian Sea, the implementation of cooperation projects with North African Countries. She is also coordinating maritime policy in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.*

Good governance at sea is a crucial prerequisite for an open, safe and secure global maritime domain. Openness means that the global maritime domain must allow free trade and transport. It must be safe for shipping and economic activities, for supporting recreation of fish stocks and ecological integrity should be safeguarded. Safety and security prevent the seas and oceans from becoming arenas for international disputes or safe havens for terrorism or organised maritime crime.

The European Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) are developing a security angle to the Integrated Maritime Policy. Or reversely, giving a maritime dimension to our Common Security and Defence Policy. It is clear that without security, a whole range of activities, such as shipping, oil extraction, offshore renewable energy, or deep sea mining will be compromised. In most cases, the solution to each problem will have to be a combination of several different actions, jointly planned and managed by a multitude of players both on land and at sea.

The EU's Integrated Maritime Policy aims at providing what has been essentially missing: an overarching approach between sectors. It is meant to seek coherence between sectorial policy areas taking account of the each sea basin's specificities. Today's global world requires global solutions. More cooperation is fundamental to safeguard our interests, to protect our citizens and to save and reduce budgets, especially in times of economic crises. Cooperation provides an opportunity for European nations to acquire together what would be out of reach individually. It can be said that maritime security is at the crossroads of interests, responsibilities and competences of Member States and the EU institutions. It is about pooling, sharing and cooperating.



If we want satisfactory protection, then EU institutions, national civilian administrations and the military need to sit down at the appropriate levels and work together. Civilian and military authorities can no longer be viewed in isolation. The distinction between military and civilian technology has become blurred. Innovations in sectors like space or maritime surveillance have both civil and military applications. A common EU maritime security framework will provide the necessary strategic guidelines for this kind of cooperation.

We should look into the possibility to develop actions for joint capability development and capacity building. We do need common standards for communication technologies and interoperability between response capabilities. We could envisage shared systems for risk management based on a joint methodology. We could streamline our many alerts systems. We could use better maritime knowledge clusters on research and develop a joint agenda for maritime security research.

I am also convinced the Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE) for the surveillance of the EU maritime domain may serve as tool for attaining these objectives. CISE aims to enhance maritime knowledge of the global situation at sea and it will allow authorities to exchange relevant information across sectors and borders. Since the objective of this initiative is limited to ensure the interoperability of existing and future maritime surveillance systems, the intention is not to develop any new maritime surveillance system. Enhancing relevant information exchange should foster co-operation between maritime surveillance authorities at every level.

Such a co-operation would inter alia strive for more effective and coordinated actions, create synergies, mutual knowledge, sharing of experience and hopefully lead to common actions at sea. We will make our CISE Policy proposal beginning of 2014 and it should confirm the need for and principles of CISE as regards cost efficiency, better interoperability and better operational effectiveness. It will also indicate what needs to be done, how, by whom and when, to make CISE fully operational by 2020.

To conclude, we are convinced that the key to success lies in information sharing, cooperation and in looking at the sea in an integrated manner. The transition from a national or sectorial to a collaborative approach is fundamentally about a change of mind-set. This process has started with the Integrated Maritime Policy. And again in this context, surveillance collaboration is a fundamental ingredient. For all these reasons the EU is putting a lot of effort to linking the various elements of what still constitutes too much of a puzzle.


"I2C develops innovative capabilities to detect suspicious vessels and issue alerts to operators for deeper analysis and decision making".



I2C: an R&D Integrated Project

Paolo Salieri *is principal Scientific & Policy Officer in the Directorate General for Enterprise and Industry of the European Commission . He is part of the Security Research unit and is in particularly in charge of the activities related to Border Security .*

Security research matters for protecting EU citizens but also for guarding European economy and environment. This is the reason why among the ten themes of the FP7 programme, (civil) security research is considered as a vector to support the development of innovative solutions and to facilitate their rapid take-up for the implementation of socially acceptable security policies and programmes.



- **I2C**
- PERSEUS
- SEABILLA
- OPARUS
- AMASS
- WIMAAS
- OPERAMAR

Coordinator: DCNS (FR)
Total Cost: 15. 962 707 €
EU Contribution: 9. 869 621 €
Start Date: 01 October 2010
Duration: 48 months

Principles:

- Collaborative research : minimum 3 entities from 3 countries
- Grants (subvention): 50% funding (75 % exceptionally), IPR belong to proposers
- Selection based on independent peer review

Security research is split into different categories: the security of citizens, the security of infrastructure and utilities, the restoration of security and safety in case of crisis, and intelligent surveillance and border security. The latter directly affects maritime security. In the framework of FP7, several projects are being run in order to deepen maritime border surveillance. Among those projects, I2C aims to propose a new generation of sea border surveillance systems integrating current and developing capacities to monitor vessel behaviours.





In order to propose a new generation of sea border surveillance systems, the I2C project has to provide capacities to those existing systems on coastal stations and to patrol maritime assets tasked to survey hot spots over wide areas. Therefore, the project integrates data processing capabilities for the detection of vessels and for identification of threats in order to permit the quick report of incidents to authorities and the planning of relevant actions.

In concrete terms, during the project's demonstration phase (2013 to 2014), the I2C prototype will collect data from networked coastal stations, service providers and deployed patrols at sea, which will allow them to continuously track suspicious small boats locally, and merchant or fishing ships widely over the Mediterranean basin. Nevertheless, along shore lines the density of small boat may be high as well as the density of medium and large vessels may be significant.

Therefore, the I2C develops innovative capabilities to automatically detect suspicious vessels and issue alerts to operators for deeper analysis and decision making. In order to do so, novel coastal radar technologies and high resolution optical cameras have been employed for both wide ranging and small boat detection under all weather conditions. Wide ranging refers to technologies and cameras used beyond the line of sight of current radar. The installed prototypes are being experimented in end user operational centres. The results are very promising in terms of improved detection capabilities.

Detections are based on rules combining various conditions on the information layered in the situational picture such as track profiles, navigation, geographic area, intelligence or even vessel data files. These rules are set up by operators on the basis of intelligence and of their threat knowledge like migrant trips (sea Beaufort above 6, mid-night without moon or on board very old small fishing vessel).

These detections of vessels and identification of threats are a question of European security and need to be dealt with in the research area. Because Europe 2020 and the Innovation Union underline the need to closer connect research with innovation; because security research is a field where the Lisbon Treaty provides increased competences to the EU to the extent of Freedom, Security and Justice and because the Treaty gives enlarged competences

OCTOBER 2010 - OCTOBER 2014

I2C

Integrated System for Interoperable sensors & Information sources for Common abnormal vessel behaviour detection & Collaborative identification of threat



IDENTIFICATION



DETECTION OF SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITIES

LAYERED SITUATIONAL PICTURE



SENSOR NETWORK & SERVICE PROVIDERS

DCNS · SEVENTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMME · European Commission · I2C

Rockwell Collins · ONERA · METEO SIM · ARMINES · ASTRA · SOFRESUD · KONGSBERG · ERIC VAN HOOYDONK LAWYERS · ClearPriority · KONGSBERG SPACETEC

INTUILAB · AJECO · ZEPPELIN Neue Technologie · IRIT · AIRSHIPVISION · FURUNO FINLAND OY · ecomer

"I2C is designed to address the needs of European States in the field of maritime surveillance".




I2C: the Example of Irregular Immigration

Michel Morel *worked in Aerospatiale as an engineer and then joined the European Satellite Agency. He also worked for the European Union Satellite Centre's scientific division. He is now R&D manager of DCNS Direction as a coordinator for the development of coastal maritime surveillance system for sea security. He is the Project Coordinator of I2C.*

Irregular immigration at sea is a challenge for many European Union Members States, who have to deal with frequent wrecks resulting in humanitarian crises while trying to develop a common response to protect their maritime borders. The I2C system has been created to help the States facing these challenges by providing capacities for an early detection of illegal and criminal activities at sea, in time to find the relevant solution and to intervene if required.

Irregular immigration at sea can take a multitude of different forms. For example, they are two methods used by irregular migrant vessels and boats to approach the coast of destination. The first method aims at reaching land while avoiding detection by the local authorities; the other one, on the contrary, tries to draw the attention of these authorities in order to be rescued in their territorial waters. In both cases, detecting smuggling vessels at sea is a key challenge for maritime States, particularly for those with large search and rescue areas of responsibility.

The future generation of integrated sea surveillance solutions shall contribute to early detection of such modus operandi to stop deaths that occur among migrant trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea. To respond to the needs of maritime States, the I2C ("Eye to Sea") prototyped system has been specifically designed to set up real time and permanent maritime intelligent common situational picture over large maritime territories. It provides an online decision aid bench of tools for detection of any suspicious activities performed by cooperative and non cooperative vessels (including small boats) with identification of the associated threats. I2C is an integrated project selected in the topic "Intelligent surveillance and enhancing border security" of the seventh UE Framework Programme for R&D. It is coordinated by DCNS and includes 19 European partners. I2C capacities encompass a network of surveillance coastal stations, new sensors to either detect small boats approaching the shore or medium boats at long range, innovative assets such as long endurance airships with a very high resolution camera and offshore surveillance patrol vessels equipped for rescue operation - all these capacities are connected to each other to share information. The data they collect are correlated to complementary information provided by service providers (meteorological forecasts, geographical data, vessel identities and histories, intelligences, etc.) for detection of suspicious activities at sea, like for example irregular migrant vessels.






First I2C demonstration campaign (July 2013)

Airship Payload



Wescam camera & the Rockwell Collins FMCW radar for detection & identification of small boat

I2C real time common intelligent situational picture



Red flags are alerts on detected suspicious vessel activities according to edited known modus operandi by users

I2C solution has implemented a standardized data model and a protected communication network to share information between the deployed capacities and also external organisations. Facilities required all involved parties (asset crews, organisations and decision makers) to share a common understanding of ongoing suspicious activities at sea to jointly plan and perform operations either for controlling detected suspicious vessels or rescue people. I2C is designed to address the needs of European States in the field of maritime surveillance: its experimentation has proven the ability of the system to detect a wide range of suspicious activities at sea, such as irregular immigration at sea or illegal fishing. The pictures show a few I2C capacities and the common intelligent situational picture.

The recent events in the Mediterranean Sea have highlighted the need for a European crisis management response to deal with irregular migration. The surveillance of activities at sea, and the sharing of information are crucial steps toward the build up of this response. The I2C project has demonstrated its utility while dealing with early detection of illegal and criminal activities and can be further developed as an indispensable European integrated decision-making tool. The FP7 project has provided a promising prototype, able to address the most crucial threats at sea. It could be the basis of a global European maritime surveillance system and its results should be used to developed common standards at the EU level.

Opinions

"The European Union is a global player and so are European shipowners".



Gesine Meissner

Gesine Meissner *is a member of the European Parliament. She was the European Parliament's rapporteur for Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP) in 2010, shadow-rapporteur for Blue Growth and Marine Knowledge 2020 and rapporteur for Maritime Spatial Planning (MSP).*

Developing a EMSS as "maritime" part of the European Security Strategy (ESS) is truly overdue. As rapporteur for Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP) in 2010, shadow-rapporteur for Blue Growth and Marine Knowledge 2020 and rapporteur for Maritime Spatial Planning (MSP) I have been very much involved in discussions about maritime safety and security. From the very beginning governance and surveillance had been part of IMP. The European Commission divided IMP in five key policy areas: Blue Growth, Marine Knowledge 2020, MSP, Sea basin strategies and Integrated Maritime Surveillance. In all of these policies progress was made. However, the development of a Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE) is still in process. The European Parliament already asked the Commission in 2008 to examine whether a harmonisation of border protection by establishing a European Coastguard could be reasonable and increase efficiency.

An integrated and European approach for better surveillance and security in- and outside the European waters is crucial for achieving the goals of the "Limassol Declaration on a Marine and Maritime Agenda for growth and jobs". "Blue Growth" means increasing maritime transport, offshore-energy, aquaculture, coastal tourism and blue biotechnology. Therefore a safe and secure environment needs to be developed. Hence, a European Maritime Security Strategy is not only useful to protect our borders – compared with the US Europe`s coastline is 7 times longer - but for many other reasons as well. The European Union is a global player and so are European shipowners. The oceans and seas are the key to a successful operating European economy. However, in the last years shipowners are facing pirates' attacks in African waters. Since 2009 the TRAN-committee is concentrating on finding solutions to fight piracy and guarantee secure motorways of the sea. As this is not only a transport-issue, we initiated last year a cross-committee-resolution that made proposals for cross-sectoral solutions and actions via external, defence and development policy. Regarding maritime transport the authorisation for vessels to have armed guards on board helped a lot preventing pirates' attacks. But not all Member States allow their shipowners to engage armed guards. Meanwhile piracy is not any more a problem only in Somalia and at the horn of Africa but as well in Westafrican countries like Nigeria. But in Nigerian waters vessels with armed guards on board are not permitted. This shows that fighting piracy and ensuring security for European maritime transport is an ongoing problem that should be tackled by the EMSS.

"It is self-evident the military has a key role in Maritime Security".



Rear Admiral Bruce Williams

***Bruce Williams** was promoted Rear Admiral on appointment as Chief of Staff to HQ Allied (NATO) Maritime Command in 2009. Since 2011, he fulfils his appointment as Deputy Director General European Union Military Staff in Brussels.*

The EU focus on the global maritime domain has increased significantly in recent years. This is indicative of the degree to which the Union prizes the sea in facilitating today's globalised investment and trade markets and supply chains – it is not an exaggeration to claim that upon the sea Europe's prosperity is based.

Such revived focus has generated increasing awareness of the complex and interconnected interests, threats and challenges at sea and along the coast that have direct impact on the EU Member States' economy and national security. Consequently, the complex and diverse approach of the EU towards the maritime domain - involving a huge variety of stakeholders and covering a large spectrum of maritime policies, activities, programmes, systems and projects - is mainly seeking today improved governance and security of the maritime domain. They have to be addressed holistically to realise efficient and enduring effects. Initiated by the Council Conclusions from 2010, the on-going work for the development of a EU Maritime Security Strategy has promoted institutional acknowledgement of importance of maritime security to the EU's global interests.

Additionally, it has highlighted the need for a strategic framework to provide the context and coherence for the diverse and wide array of sector-specific maritime policies and activities (including the military dimension within it). Such a strategy, as well as codifying strategic maritime interests of the EU, must also propose ways of protecting them. It is self-evident the military has a key role in Maritime Security. However, equally axiomatic Maritime Security cannot be the reserve of any single authority.

The maritime field is a vast and complex domain at the crossroads of interests, responsibilities and competences of the EU institutions and Member States. It also cuts across the traditional boundaries and competences of defence, maritime transport, trade, fisheries, law enforcement, justice and other maritime clusters. The challenge is to grapple with a plethora of interests and instruments (civil and military, private and public, governmental and non-governmental, industry and interest groups, national and European) in order to weave them together into a truly coherent EU Comprehensive approach. A first that, although hugely demanding in its gestation, promises much.

"The evolving character of 21st century security challenges underscores that many future crises will have a maritime dimension".



Jamie Shea

Jamie Shea *is NATO's Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges. The views expressed in this op-ed are those of the author alone. They do not represent an official position of NATO.*

A majority of NATO members and European countries are coastal states linking the Mediterranean, the Black sea and the Baltic and North seas to the Atlantic. Two are islands. Moreover, five NATO allies border the Arctic region, which is growing rapidly in geo-strategic importance. During the Cold War, preserving the Atlantic sea lines of communication to allow North America to support and resupply Western Europe was one of NATO's principal tasks and "raison d'être". It was arguably just as important to deterrence and active defence as the presence of US troops and nuclear weapons on the European mainland. Yet, by contrast, the modern post-Cold War NATO has been much more a land affair with its largest ever operation (ISAF) in land-locked Afghanistan and other lengthy troop deployments in Bosnia and Kosovo. Its maritime missions, Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean and Ocean Shield in the Gulf of Aden, have been by contrast smaller in scope. For some time already, the major focus of navies has been to support land or air operations with embargoes or logistics tasks, as occurred recently during NATO's Libya campaign. Yet, as the Alliance's Afghan mission draws to its close at the end of 2014, this land focus may well be about to change. The evolving character of 21st century security challenges underscores that many future crises will have a maritime dimension. This concept can best be encapsulated in four "Ds".

The first is **disasters**. Major storms and freak weather conditions, whether or not caused by climate change, have highlighted the role of navies as the first responders. We have seen this with Hurricane Haiya in the Philippines or the Indonesian tsunami or the earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan's nuclear power plant at Fukushima.

The second is **diplomacy**. A multi polar world is leading to the emergence of more naval powers – China, India and Brazil being but the latest examples. As these rising powers assert their presence on the international scene, joint maritime exercises, information-sharing, search and rescue and participation in multinational counter-piracy operations can help to build confidence, as can agreements on the prevention of incidents at sea. It is often easier to engage naval forces in these endeavours on the high seas than to do more politically sensitive land or air exercises. Naval forces can also be usefully engaged in capacity-building and in training and education.

The third dimension is **disputes**. The resuscitated territorial disputes and bilateral rivalries that have come with the emergence of new powers are also producing new naval build-ups and modernisation programmes. This will put a new emphasis on maritime deterrence and presence to prevent miscalculations and incidents that could degenerate into armed conflicts. The maritime forces of the United States can play a key role to demonstrate resolve in reassuring Allies especially in the Asia-Pacific region while also engaging China and India in ways that prevent the emergence of new dividing lines, such as Europe witnessed before the First World War. Naval hot lines, port visits and joint exercises are part of the effort to establish regional security structures that can defuse tensions and foster more transparency and predictability in military activities. Developing maritime situational awareness and intelligence and surveillance (using also maritime patrol aircraft and maritime drones) will be a key instrument henceforth for crisis management.

The final "d" is **disruption**. 90% of world trade goes by sea, as well as 85% of China's imports. The Gulf of Aden is the transit route for 30% of Europe's critical energy supplies. So at a time when the oceans are the key "global commons" for the world's energy, trade and communications network, keeping the main transit routes and choke points free from disruption, whether man-made or natural in origin, will be a naval task of growing importance.

As NATO and EU's Member States countries endeavour to rise to these challenges, they will face difficult decisions in a context of declining defence budgets. Should we build aircraft carriers or coastal patrol speed boats; maritime patrol aircraft or drones; invest in nuclear or conventional submarines? Above all, how can we make our ships more modular and multifunctional? We will also need to integrate naval capabilities more into Smart Defence and pooling and sharing multinational projects in order to save money and promote better role specialization. NATO and the EU must also engage their Partners more in maritime interoperability, exercises and training, especially for NATO as part of its post-ISAF Connected Forces Initiative. The participation of a Ukrainian ship in Ocean Shield, as well as Ukrainian and Russian vessels in Active Endeavour, shows the way ahead. As security shifts to the seas, we need to shift as well, and fast. We must develop the capabilities, strategies and the inter-agency approach to ensure that the three quarters of the world's surface made of water becomes a zone of peace and cooperation, and not one of rivalries and conflict.

Epilogue



Christoph Raab

European Security Round Table

The European Security Round Table (ESRT) is a neutral platform between the EU Institutions, NATO and other relevant stakeholders supporting the discussion about European security and defence issues. With its tailored events, it creates a forum for decision-makers to meet in a very informal manner and setting. This is an important supplement to official meeting formats as such events allow more open discussions and facilitate the direct communication among relevant stakeholders.

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European Security Round Table sprl
Rue d'Arlon 51, 1040 Bruxelles
Tel.: +32 (0)2.640.63.92 - Fax: +32 (0)2.646.61.93
www.security-round-table.eu
info@security-round-table.eu

The numerous challenges of the EU's maritime environment are of crucial importance. The EU needs a strategic document that will be both the result and the beginning of a necessary political cooperation in that area.

The contributions in this booklet have all highlighted the importance of elaborating a European Maritime Security Strategy (EMSS). They gave a clearer idea of the main motives, features and possible outcomes of such a strategy.

In more practical terms, European research has already given its impulse to several projects dedicated to the development of technical tools making this result-oriented cooperation possible. The I2C project is a concrete starting point for framing European sharing of data and border control.

This booklet is a statement of cross-sectorial and cross-institutional consensus. Different units and committees are called upon to work together as well as different institutions are involved.

Because the establishment of a European Maritime Security Strategy is a general question of European security, defence and welfare, all those contributions constitute a relevant input for the up-coming European Council of December 2013 and are summed up in a list of recommendations.

Christoph Raab
Chairman of the ESRT

Contact Information

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European Security Round Table

Rue d'Arlon, 51
1040 Brussels
Tel: +32 2 640 6392
Fax: +32 2 646 6193

www.security-round-table.eu





